By 
Executive Summary
The debate on real-time transmission of election results in Nigeria has generated intense public interest but also widespread conceptual confusion. At the centre of this confusion is a persistent failure to distinguish between ballots cast and votes cast, and an unrealistic expectation of what technology can deliver within Nigeria’s current manual voting system.
RELATED: Safeguarding democracy: Why digital transformation of the electoral process is critical
This policy paper clarifies the operational realities of Nigeria’s electoral process, explains why real-time transmission during voting is technically and legally infeasible, identifies what forms of electronic transmission are appropriate, and situates Nigeria’s experience within established international practices. It concludes with practical policy options and legislative recommendations aimed at strengthening electoral transparency without undermining process integrity.
1. Understanding the Electoral Process: Legal and Operational Realities
Nigeria operates a manual, paper-based voting system. Ballots are issued to voters, marked physically, and deposited into non-electronic ballot boxes. Counting occurs only after voting has concluded.
Any discussion of real-time transmission must therefore begin with a clear understanding of what data exists, when it exists, and in what form.
2. Ballots Cast vs Votes Cast: Definitions and Implications
Ballots Cast
A ballot is a physical voting instrument marked by the voter.
Under Nigeria’s current system:
- Ballot boxes are not equipped with electronic sensors or counters
- Ballots do not generate digital data at polling units
- Ballots cannot be automatically classified by party or candidate
- The total number of ballots cast becomes known only after manual counting
Implication:
Real-time electronic transmission of ballots during voting is technically impossible, because no digital data is produced at the point of voting.
Votes Cast
Votes are the legal outcomes of ballot counting, not the act of voting itself. Votes only come into existence after:
- Polling closes
- Ballot boxes are opened
- Ballots are sorted and counted manually
- Votes are allocated to parties or candidates
- Invalid or spoiled ballots are identified
- Results are documented and endorsed by party agents
Only at this stage does a legally recognisable and verifiable “vote count” exist.
Implication:
Electronic transmission pertains to verified results, not to ballots or voting activity.
3. Why Real-Time Transmission During Voting Is Not Feasible
Calls for real-time transmission often assume that votes are digitally generated as they are cast. This assumption is incompatible with Nigeria’s electoral architecture.
Under the present system:
- Voting and counting are sequential, not simultaneous
- No electronic infrastructure exists at polling units to generate live vote data
- Attempting transmission during voting would produce unverifiable information
- Such data would lack legal standing and auditability
Legislating real-time transmission during voting would therefore contradict:
- Process logic
- Electoral integrity principles
- Legal verifiability requirements
4. What Electronic Transmission Can Legitimately Achieve
Electronic transmission is appropriate only after manual counting and validation at polling units.
The lawful and operationally sound sequence is:
- Voting concludes
- Ballots are counted manually at polling units
- Votes are allocated and documented
- Official result forms are completed
- Party agents endorse the results
- Signed results are electronically transmitted to collation centres and central databases
At this stage, electronic transmission enhances:
- Transparency
- Speed of collation
- Public confidence
- Reduction of post-count manipulation risks
What is transmitted is verified result data, not raw ballots.
5. Comparative International Practices
International experience confirms that electronic transmission depends on how votes are generated, not on political preference.
United States
- Many jurisdictions use optical scanners
- Ballots are scanned at polling units, generating digital vote data
- Results can be transmitted electronically because votes are digitally tabulated at source
- Paper ballots remain available for audits and recounts
Key lesson:
Electronic transmission is possible only where votes are digitally generated and auditable.
India
- Uses Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs)
- Votes are recorded electronically
- Counting occurs at designated centres under strict supervision
- Results are published after verification, not during voting
Key lesson:
Electronic voting systems must be purpose-built for secure digital counting.
Kenya
- Uses biometric voter identification
- Results are transmitted electronically after manual counting
- Party agent sign-off is mandatory before transmission
Key lesson: “Real-time” refers to speed after counting, not during voting.
United Kingdom
- Uses paper ballots exclusively
- Votes are counted manually
- Results are published only after verification
- No claim of real-time vote counts during polling hours
Key lesson:
Even advanced democracies prioritise accuracy and verification over immediacy.
6. The Policy Risk of Conceptual Ambiguity
Failure to clearly distinguish ballots from votes leads to:
- Unrealistic legislative mandate
- Contradictory legal interpretations
- Increased election litigation
- Politicisation of electoral technology
- Misallocation of public funds toward unworkable solutions
Policy language must therefore be precise, process-aware, and legally coherent.
7. Policy Options for Lawmakers
Option 1: Strengthen Post-Count Electronic Transmission
- Codify electronic transmission of polling-unit-level results
- Mandate immediate public visibility after counting
- Strengthen audit trails and data redundancy
Option 2: Pilot Controlled Digital Counting Systems
- Explore optical scan or electronic tabulation technologies
- Develop strict verification and audit mechanisms
- Pilot in selected jurisdictions before scaling
Option 3: Maintain Manual Voting with Enhanced Transparency
- Retain paper ballots
- Improve observer access and result publication timelines
- Clarify legal definitions of “real-time transmission”
8. Legislative Recommendations
Lawmakers should:
- Clearly distinguish ballots cast from votes cast in electoral law
- Avoid mandating technically infeasible real-time requirements
- Align technology adoption with process readiness
- Prioritise verifiability, inclusiveness, and public trust over speed
- Require INEC to electronically transmit signed and certified polling-unit results immediately after counting
Final Thoughts
Nigeria cannot transmit in real time what it does not generate in real time. In a system where voting, counting, and collation are sequential and manual, the demand for real-time transmission during voting reflects a misunderstanding of both process design and technological capability.
Real-time transmission becomes meaningful only after ballots have been manually counted, results verified, and outcomes endorsed at the polling unit. At that point, technology serves its proper role: accelerating transparency, reducing post-count manipulation, and strengthening public confidence—without compromising verifiability or legality.
Comparative international experience is unambiguous. Credible electoral systems do not sacrifice accuracy, auditability, and legal certainty for speed. Whether operating paper-based or electronic systems, successful democracies ensure that results are generated through processes that can be independently verified, audited, and defended in law before they are transmitted or published.
“Lawmakers must be grounded technology policy in operational reality, not aspirational rhetoric”
For electoral reform to be effective, lawmakers must therefore be grounded technology policy in operational reality, not aspirational rhetoric. Technology should reinforce process integrity, not attempt to bypass it. Any reform that ignores this principle risks creating unverifiable outcomes, legal disputes, and further erosion of public trust—undermining the very democratic legitimacy it seeks to protect.
In this context, Nigeria’s path forward is clear: strengthen post-count electronic transmission, clarify legal definitions, and align technological adoption with institutional readiness. Only by doing so can electoral technology serve as a stabilising force in Nigeria’s democratic evolution rather than a source of persistent controversy.
About the Author
Dr. Agu Collins Agu is the Pioneer Director of Research & Development at the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA). He is a Nigerian technologist, systems architect, and policy-oriented innovator with decades of experience spanning engineering systems, digital infrastructure, and technology-enabled governance solutions.
He architected the first successfully deployed electronic voting (e-voting) system adopted by the Nigerian Society of Engineers (NSE) during its national convention in Ilorin, marking a significant milestone in the practical application of secure digital voting within Nigerian professional institutions.
The system demonstrated that electronic voting can succeed in Nigeria when process design, institutional trust, transparency, and technology are properly aligned—a principle that strongly informs Dr. Agu’s perspectives on electoral reform.
Dr. Agu brings a rare combination of hands-on system design expertise and deep understanding of institutional, legal, and process constraints, enabling him to contribute meaningfully to policy discourse on electoral technology, digital transformation, and governance reform.
He continues to advise on technology policy and innovation-led institutional reform, with particular interest in electoral systems, capacity development, and the responsible adoption of emerging technologies in Nigeria and beyond.
You can download the article from: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yDAddy1_vsArueYHQdEnxyXvPq5E7-vY/view?usp=sharing
